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Using RICO to Reach into the Corporate
Pocket: Vicarious Civil Liability of the
Business Entity Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
Laura Ginger*
I. Introduction
The liability of the so-called "legitimate business entity" for
treble damages and attorney's fees pursuant to a civil action brought
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)1 is a matter of great concern to corporations and other busi-
ness entities as well as to the bar which serves them. Such an entity
can "act" only through its human agents and employees, thus its
liability is necessarily vicarious, based not upon its "own" behavior,
but upon the behavior of those who act on its behalf.2 Thus, the
question of corporate liability under RICO is really a question of
whether and under what circumstances the Act contemplates vicari-
ous liability of the corporation for the RICO violations of its agents
or employees.
The stakes in this debate "are enormous for everyone."' The
question is an important one for businesspersons and for their law-
yers. Imposing vicarious liability upon the business entity is often the
only way to find a deep enough pocket to make the lawsuit worth-
while, even under RICO. In addition, the use of vicarious liability in
conjunction with civil RICO exposes corporations and other busi-
nesses to treble damage liability for the acts of even low-level em-
ployees. Thus, the real question is whether and under what circum-
stances a civil plaintiff, in true derivative fashion, can reach the
corporate purse under RICO.4
Persons seeking to answer this question will find little guidance
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Business. B.A.
1976, DePauw University; J.D., 1979, The University of Chicago Law School.
1. The Act is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982); private civil suits for treble
damages and attorney's fees are authorized at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
2. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
3. Dwyer & Kiely, Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 324, 325 (1985).
4. Id. at 326.
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in the language of the RICO statute or in its legislative history, for
both are silent on the issue.5 Moreover, federal courts struggling
with this problem have been unable to agree on its resolution. Some
have ruled that a corporation or other business entity can never be
liable, vicariously or otherwise, under the RICO statute;6 other
courts have ruled that a corporation can be vicariously liable under
any and all of RICO's provisions, just as under any other statute or
common-law rule of liability;7 still other judges have found that a
corporation can be vicariously liable under some of RICO's provi-
sions but not under others. 8 The commentators have likewise been of
several minds on the issue.9
This Article will analyze the question of whether, under what
standard, and to what extent the legitimate business entity should be
held liable under civil RICO for the actions of its agents or employ-
ees. Part I of the Article will outline the relevant statutory provisions
of RICO and review the common law doctrines under which a prin-
cipal or employer may be held liable for the acts of its agent or
employee. The rationale for imputing the misdeeds of an agent or
employee to his or her principal or employer will also be examined.
Part 1I of the Article will describe the controversy over whether and
when a legitimate business should be liable under RICO, review the
court decisions concerning these entities' derivative liability under
RICO, and survey the statutory language and purposes of RICO and
the policy considerations which bear upon the issue. Part Ill of the
Article will propose a standard to be used in imposing vicarious lia-
bility on the legitimate business entity under civil RICO.
I1. Statutory and Common Law Background
A. The Statutory Scheme
RICO prohibits three types of activity by "persons" in connec-
tion with an "enterprise": the investment of racketeering proceeds in
an interstate enterprise;10 the acquisition or maintenance of an inter-
5. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 76-78, 119-26 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 161-92 and accompanying text.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). Section 1962(a) states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal
. . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the pro-
ceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
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est in an interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity;"1 and the conducting of interstate enterprise affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity."2 "Person" is defined quite broadly
to include "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property." 1 "Enterprise" is defined equally
broadly to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals as-
sociated in fact although not a legal entity.""
It is thus clear that a legitimate business entity such as a corp-
oration, partnership, or trust can be an offending "person" within the
terms of the statute if it controls or participates in the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The same legit-
imate business entity can also be an "enterprise" for RICO purposes.
In a RICO action involving an alleged enterprise which is also a
legitimate business, the question becomes whether that business may
also be alleged to be the "person" who has violated the statute. It is
this circumstance which raises the issue of the propriety of vicarious
liability under RICO.
B. Common-Law Bases for Vicarious Liability
One of the thorniest issues facing counsel and the courts today
is whether RICO contemplates vicarious liability (sometimes given
the Latin name respondeat superior); that is, civil liability based
upon the liability or fault of another.1 5 In the RICO context, this
involves the question of whether liability is appropriately placed
upon the principal, whose agent has violated the statute while acting
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982). Section 1962(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Section 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of un-
lawful debt.
Id.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
15. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS].
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within the scope of his agency, or upon the employer whose em-
ployee has violated the statute in the course of his employment. Be-
cause RICO imposes civil liability for criminal acts,"6 the common
law bases of both criminal and civil liability will be reviewed.
1. Criminal Responsibility.-The federal courts have adopted
a relatively expansive view of corporate criminal responsibility for
the misconduct of agents. A corporation may be responsible not only
for the actions of its officers, directors, and other policymakers, but
also for the acts of middle-level managers and supervisors, and even
for the acts of subordinate or low-level employees. 7
Corporate agents can bind the corporate entity by their wrong-
ful conduct only when they act within the scope of their employ-
ment. Criminal conduct, however, may be considered to be within
that scope of employment even if the corporation has not authorized
the conduct of the employee, has acted in good faith to prevent such
conduct generally, and has specifically prohibited the very act which
is the basis of criminal liability." It seems, then, that the phrase
"within the scope of employment" is indeed merely "a term of art
signifying little more than that the employee's crime must be com-
mitted in connection with his performance of some job-related
activity."' 9
Thus, under federal jurisprudence, involvement of the corpora-
tion's managerial or supervisory personnel is not a necessary condi-
tion to corporate criminal liability.2 0 Moreover, the federal courts
have rejected the defenses that the corporation did not authorize the
illegal conduct, that the acts were committed without the knowledge
of the corporation's officers and directors, that the unlawful activities
had been specifically forbidden as a matter of corporate policy, and
that the executives had exercised great care to prevent such unlawful
activities by lower-level personnel."
The Model Penal Code, on the other hand, limits the vicarious
16. Section 1964(c) of the Act authorizes private civil suits against those who violate
§ 1962 of the Act, and § 1962 of the Act imposes liability based in part on engaging in
"racketeering activity," which is defined in terms of a long list of federal and state criminal
offenses, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c), 1962, and 1961(1) (1982). See also Dwyer & Kiely, supra
note 3, at 325, 345; supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text; infra note 161.
17. See generally I K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, ch. 3 (1984).
18. Id. at 40.
19. Id.
20. Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, A.B.A. SEC. CORP., BANKING & BUS.
L. at 345 (1985) [hereinafter Civil RICO Task Force Report].
21. Id. at 345 n.552 and cases cited therein. See also Miller & Levine, Recent Develop-
ments in Corporate Criminal Liability, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 41 (1984).
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criminal liability of corporations to two situations. Liability is im-
posed when there exists a legislative purpose to impose such corpo-
rate liability coupled with the performance of the conduct constitut-
ing the offense by a corporate agent acting within the scope of his
employment on behalf of the corporation. Offenses which are author-
ized, commanded, solicited, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the
board of directors or a high managerial agent also result in criminal
liability.22
2. Civil Liability.-Vicarious civil liability of the corporation,
or respondeat superior liability, is well-established.23 Under tradi-
tional agency law, a principal is liable for the torts or other miscon-
duct of its agents committed within the scope of either their employ-
ment or their apparent authority or which are subsequently ratified
by the principal.2 This is true even if the agent acted without actual
authority or without any intent to benefit the principal, as long as
the injured third party reasonably believed the agent was acting
within the scope of his authority. 5
The doctrine of respondeat superior is based on risk allocation
principles and reflects a desire to encourage commercial enterprises
to supervise their employees closely. 6 The doctrine can even be used
to make corporations liable for punitive damages when their agents
have acted with apparent authority, regardless of actual authority or
ratification.27 As recently as 1982, the United States Supreme Court
stated that "few doctrines of the law are more firmly established or
22. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.07(1)(a),(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also
Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593
(1988).
23. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 348; Goldsmith, Civil RICO Re-
form: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REV. 827, 856 (1987) [hereinafter Goldsmith,
Civil RICO Reform].
24. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 15, at §§ 69-70; W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 83 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 217C (puni-
tive damages), 257 (misrepresentation of agent), 261 (principal puts agent in a position to
deceive); 262 (agent acting for his own purpose) (1957).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 262 comment a (1957).
26. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 15, § 69 at 501; Civil RICO Task
Force Report, supra note 20, at 348, 363-64; Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23,
at 855-56.
27. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 15, § 2 at 13. But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979) (liability for punitive damages should be limited to situa-
tions where agent at a policymaking level, agent in managerial position, or employer recklessly
hired or retained unfit agent who committed wrong). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, which limits a principal's vicarious liability for punitive damages, takes the position,
however, that a principal may be vicariously liable for punitive damages when that liability is
based upon "special statutes such as those giving triple damages," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 217C comment c (1957). RICO is, of course, one of these statutes. See also Dwyer
& Kiely, supra note 3, at 337; Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 875.
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more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy than [respon-
deat superior]."28
III. The Propriety of Corporate Liability Under Civil RICO
A. Should a "Legitimate Enterprise" Ever Be Liable Under
RICO?
There is widespread agreement that Congress intended RICO to
thwart the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime,2 9
and that this was the principal purpose underlying RICO's adop-
tion.30 Thus, "there can be little argument that Congress intended
legitimate businesses to be the main beneficiaries of RICO's provi-
sions.""1 It is equally undisputed, however, that in practice legiti-
mate businesses have become the principal targets of RICO. 2
At least one prominent commentator, Richard Nathan, believes
that a legitimate enterprise should never be held to have violated
RICO or to be liable to anyone under RICO on any theory of liabil-
ity."3 Therefore, it is necessary to resolve the threshold question of
whether liability of a legitimate business entity is ever appropriate
under the RICO statute.
Nathan has made the following assertion:
I do not believe that there is any circumstance in which a
legitimate enterprise-one formed for lawful purposes and
which continues to be owned, at least in part, by innocent per-
sons-may ever be held to have violated RICO or to be liable
under its provisions to anyone. I would recommend an amend-
ment to the civil treble damage liability provision that would
make this clear."
Nathan rests his thesis on the assumption that legitimate enter-
prises and their owners comprise the class that RICO seeks primar-
ily to protect. He claims that it necessarily follows that:
28. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
568 (1982) (quoting Gleason v. Seabord Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 356 (1929)).
29. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 691 (1981); Parnes v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 22 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
30. See Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 105; United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 589-91; Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. at 22.
31. Lacovara & Nicoli, Refocusing the "'Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act" on "'Corrupt Organizations", 2 Civ. RICO REP. (BNA) at I (May 5, 1987).
32. Id. at 1; Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 55-56; Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
33. See Separate Statement of Richard E. Nathan and Majority Response, Civil RICO
Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 407.
34. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original).
CIVIL RICO LIABILITY
no construction of RICO can possibly be correct that holds a
legitimate enterprise liable to others under RICO based upon
the very criminal activities from which RICO seeks to protect
the enterprise . . . Accordingly, where a legitimate enterprise
has participated in racketeering activities, to me that is evidence
that it has been infiltrated by criminals who have directed its
affairs to those wrongful purposes . . . . [T]hat firm is the vic-
tim of the criminal infiltration against which RICO protects. It
is not subject to treble damage liability; it is entitled, instead, to
a civil RICO treble damage remedy.36
In making these assertions and in framing the issue in terms of
whether a civil RICO remedy will be available "against the infil-
trated legitimate firm that was the innocent tool and victim of the
wrongdoers," 36 Nathan mistakenly assumes that all business entities
which are named as RICO defendants are innocent tools and vic-
tims. Indeed, as the majority response to Nathan's statement points
out, "this is not the universe of cases in which a 'legitimate enter-
prise' may become a RICO defendant.""7
There seems little reason to insulate from civil RICO liability
all legitimate businesses on the ground that some may be "tools" or
"victims,"3" particularly when employees have turned the supposedly
legitimate enterprise to a pattern of criminal activity of the type ad-
dressed in RICO.39 Furthermore, there is no reason to separate
RICO from other theories of liability in which corporations are ex-
posed to multiple or exemplary damages for their employees'
conduct."'
35. Id. at 408-09.
36. Id. at 409 n.659.
37. Id. at 424.
38. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v.
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 307-25 (1982) and accompanying footnotes for a discus-
sion of the enterprise in the roles of "prize," "instrument," "victim," and "perpetrator" and
whether vicarious liability should be imposed on the enterprise in each case. See also Moran,
Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflicting Precedent and the Practi-
tioner's Dilemma, 57 TEMPLE L.Q. 731, 775 (1984) (nature of legal entity's involvement with
pattern of racketeering activity will determine whether it should be named as the enterprise, a
defendant, or both); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401
(7th Cir. 1984) (RICO liability of enterprise should depend on the role played). But see
Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 3, at 340 (Blakey's functional analysis unworkable due to concep-
tual problems in characterizing corporate behavior which may be insurmountable in some
cases).
39. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 374; Majority Response to Sepa-
rate Statement of Richard Nathan, Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 424. See
also Note, RICO: The Corporation as "Enterprise" and Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 503,
521 (1983).
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also McArthur & White, Civil
RICO After Sedima: The New Weapon Against Business Fraud, 23 Hous. L. REV. 743, 755
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Finally, while the major purpose of RICO undoubtedly was to
address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime,41
the courts are all but unanimous in their refusal to read RICO as
prohibiting only the infiltration of legitimate organizations.42 Con-
gress purposely drafted RICO to address a wide variety of
problems,4 and as such, "RICO fits well into a consistent pattern of
legislation enacted as general reform over the past half century
aimed at a specific target, but drafted without limiting its scope to
that target."4
B. Reaching the Corporate Pocket Under RICO
1. Approaches to Corporate Liability.-If one surmounts the
threshold question discussed above and accepts that sometimes a le-
gitimate business entity can and should be held liable under RICO,
one must next decide under what theory to impose that liability. Any
such liability will necessarily be derivative in the sense that it will
result from the imputation of the racketeering acts of an agent or
employee to the corporation. 5 Neither the language of the RICO
statute itself nor the legislative history of the Act, however, provides
any guidance on this issue.4 As shall be shown below, the case law
(1986).
41. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
42. A Comprehensive Perspective on Civil and Criminal RICO Legislation and Litiga-
tion, REPORT OF THE RICO CASES COMMITTEE, A.B.A. CRIM. JUSTICE SEC. 8 n.18 (1985)
[hereinafter A Comprehensive Perspective].
43. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 831 & n.24. See also Blakey,
supra note 38, at 280.
44. A Comprehensive Perspective, supra note 42, at 8 n.18. See also Goldsmith, RICO
and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 788 &
nn.98-100 (1988) [hereinafter Goldsmith, A Response] (quite common for statutes to be ap-
plied to problems unrelated to specific concern that prompted their enactment, and RICO not
unique in this respect).
45. See Stern, Corporate Criminal Personal Liability-Who is the Corporation?, J.
CORP. L. 125, 126 (Fall 1987).
46. See Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165, 180 (D. Conn.
1987) ("Because the language and legislative history of the statute are silent on the issue of
vicarious liability, reference to the legislative policy underlying the statute is an appropriate
starting point."); Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 352 (RICO statute "ap-
pears to assume that the standard for both criminal and civil [derivative] liability is the same
as would otherwise apply under existing criminal and civil law"); Dwyer & Kiely, supra note
3, at 332-33 ("even if section 1962 permits the corporation to stand as a person, whether or
not different from the enterprise, RICO, by itself, does not answer the question when to im-
pute racketeering acts of an agent or employee to the corporation"); Black, Application of
Respondeat Superior Principles to Securities Fraud Claims Under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 825, 850 (1984) (RICO
contains no statutory provision which explicitly authorizes the application of respondeat supe-
rior principles); Note, supra note 39, at 521 (statutory language of RICO neither permits nor
precludes a corporation's being aligned both as enterprise and defendant); Blakey, supra note
38, at 287-88 (nothing in RICO statute compels conclusion that "person" and "enterprise"
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on the issue also presents no uniform view on derivative liability47
and "is, for the most part, conclusory and chaotic."1
4 8
Private plaintiffs who are trying to reach the corporate pocket
through RICO usually take one of two approaches: they either
charge the corporation as a defendant,49 alleging that the legitimate
business is both the "person" violating the statute (through the acts
of its agents and employees) and the affected "enterprise," 50 or they
allege that the corporation is vicariously liable under RICO for the
statutory violations of its agents or employees under traditional prin-
ciples of respondeat superior.5' Both of these approaches raise the
issue of when it is appropriate to impute the racketeering acts of an
agent or employee to the corporation.
(a) Charging the corporation as the culpable "person"
under section 1962(c) of RICO.-Courts have struggled with the
theoretical bases for imposing vicarious or derivative liability in civil
RICO cases. However, the way in which the statute has been used
by both civil practitioners and by government prosecutors has to
some extent dictated the context in which the courts have had to
confront the issue.
Civil RICO is used by private plaintiffs in civil cases far more
often than criminal RICO is used by government prosecutors in
criminal cases.52 Moreover, section 1962(c) of the statute is used
more frequently than any other RICO provision, being "by far the
substantive violation most often alleged in both criminal and civil
cases." ' That section has become the mainstay of criminal prosecu-
tions of organized criminals5 as well as of so-called legitimate busi-
nesses for a variety of white-collar crimes. 55
Most important for the current discussion is that nearly all of
the civil RICO lawsuits filed have alleged violations of section
1962(c). 6 This, along with the fact that most of these lawsuits have
either are or are not mutually exclusive elements of proof).
47. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 352.
48. Id.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
50. See infra notes 56-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of this approach.
51. See infra notes 107-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of this approach.
52. Goldsmith, A Response, supra note 44, at 790 & n.1 13. This is an especially signifi-
cant statement in view of the fact that criminal RICO "has become one of the favorite and
most useful tools of federal prosecutors in pursuing national law enforcement's prosecutory
goals," Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 18-19 & n.26.
53. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 53.
54. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 831-32.
55. Id. & 832 n.27.
56. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 57 (estimating that 97% of cases
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been aimed at business fraud rather than at organized crime and
criminals,"' means that most RICO cases which seek to reach into
the corporate pocket have attempted to use section 1962(c) to do so.
Obviously, one way to establish corporate liability is to allege
that the culpable "person" and the affected "enterprise" mentioned
in section 1962(c) of the Act are one; that the corporate enterprise
has conducted its own affairs through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity in violation of section 1962(c). The statutory definitions of
"person" and "enterprise" are certainly broad enough to support this
approach, 58 and the language of RICO neither permits nor precludes
a corporation's being aligned both as enterprise and defendant. 9 Be-
cause the language of section 1962 imposes liability only on the
"person", many plaintiffs have thought it necessary to equate the
"person" and the "enterprise" in order to claim enterprise (or corpo-
rate) liability.60
Although this approach seems to avoid entirely the issue of vica-
rious liability by charging the enterprise directly with a violation of
the Act, this pleading technique is in fact somewhat misleading. As
discussed above,61 whenever a corporation or other artificial legal
person is sued, its liability is necessarily derivative or vicarious be-
cause it is based upon the conduct of others. Therefore, the issue of
the propriety of vicarious liability in the RICO context is still pre-
sent in cases which take this approach to pleading the plaintiff's
claim.
A more serious problem with this approach is that not all courts
will permit the same entity to be both the "person" and the "enter-
prise" for purposes of section 1962(c). Indeed, most courts which
have considered the issue have ruled that the person and the enter-
prise may not be identical, and have required that the plaintiff plead
a separate person and enterprise under section 1962(c). Two com-
mentators, masters of understatement, have pointed out that such a
requirement "might pose problems in suits against corporations
based on the acts of company employees. "62
allege section 1962(c) violations).
57. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 57 (citing statistics indicating
77% of civil RICO cases are fraud cases); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing these Task Force Report statistics).
58. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of these statutory
definitions and their breadth.
59. Note, supra note 39, at 521 & n.84; Blakey, supra note 38, at 287-88; Moran, supra
note 38, at 779 n.265. See also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60. Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 3, at 327.
61. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
62. Miller & Olson, Recent Developments in Civil RICO, 8 CORP. L. REV. 35, 40 (Win-
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The issue of whether a legitimate entity may be alleged as both
the RICO enterprise and the RICO person under section 1962(c)
was joined in the courts when the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits
reached contrary results in cases decided within a day of each
other.63 Unfortunately, neither decision fully develops the basis for
its holding.6 '
In United States v. Hartley," the Eleventh Circuit held that a
single corporation can be both the person and the enterprise under
section 1962(c) of RICO. In that case, Treasure Isle, Inc., a corpo-
ration specializing in the production of breaded seafood products, a
corporate vice-president, and a plant manager had been convicted of
violating section 1962(c) by conducting the affairs of the corporation
through a pattern of racketeering activity.66 The court of appeals up-
held the convictions of all three defendants,6 7 including that of Trea-
sure Isle, Inc., for conducting its own affairs through a pattern of
racketeering.
Hartley relied upon the United States Supreme Court's broad
reading of the statutory notion of "enterprise,"6 8 the liberal construc-
tion clause which was included in the original RICO legislation,69
and the literal terms of section 1962(c) which do not exclude iden-
tity between the "person" and the "enterprise. ' '7 Its holding that a
corporation can be charged directly under that section as both the
culpable person and the affected enterprise,71 however, does not have
much of a following.7
ter 1985).
63. K. BRICKEY, supra note 17, at 244. Compare United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961
(1 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Treasure Isle, Inc.
v. United States, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983) (there may be identity between RICO enterprise and
RICO defendant) with United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983) (RICO enterprise and RICO defendant may not be
the same entity).
64. K. BRICKEY, supra note 17, at 244.
65. 678 F.2d 961 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983), cert. denied sub
nom. Treasure Isle, Inc. v. United States, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
66. 678 F.2d at 965, 966.
67. 678 F.2d at 965, 992.
68. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) ("There is no restriction upon the
associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of individu-
als associated in fact."). Id. at 580-81.
69. This clause reads as follows: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes." Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
70. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
71. 678 F.2d at 988.
72. See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans Foundation v. Erdman, C.A. No. 84-0940 (D.D.C. Jan.
24, 1986); Stanton v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ga.
1986); Leuders v. Lehman Bros., Kuhn & Loeb, Inc., No. 83-C-371 (N.D. II. June 26, 1984)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); United Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Trans
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In marked contrast with the Eleventh Circuit's approach in
Hartley, the Fourth Circuit concluded in United States v. Computer
Sciences Corporation" that there could be no identity between a
RICO enterprise and a defendant charged with violating section
1962(c) of RICO. In this case, Computer Sciences and a number of
individual defendants were charged in a fifty-seven count indictment.
Prosecutors charged violations of several federal statutes, including
those prohibiting mail fraud, wire fraud, and submitting false claims
to the United States government. 4
On appeal from the trial court's dismissal of all counts, the
court of appeals refused to reinstate the three RICO counts against
the corporation because these charges had designated the corpora-
tion's unincorporated Infonet Division as the RICO enterprise. The
court refused to reinstate because the term "enterprise was meant to
refer to a being different from, not the same as or part of, the person
whose behavior the act was designated to prohibit, and, failing that,
to punish."" This rather conclusory holding, therefore, precludes a
complaint in which the person and the enterprise do not have totally
separate identities. This reasoning has been followed in the majority
of the cases decided since it was announced. 6
Global Corp., No. 83-C-5408 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Timberlake v.
Oppenheimer & Co., No. 83-C-1295 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); United States. v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279
(D.N.J. 1984); Mooney v. Fidelity Union Bank, Nos. 82-3192, 3193 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1983);
B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 399 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d
628 (3d Cir. 1984); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Chemical Bank, No. 82-1714 (D.N.J. Oct. 27,
1982); Gerace v. Utica Veal Co., 580 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); D'Iorio v. Andonzio,
554 F. Supp. 222 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
73. 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
74. 689 F.2d at 1183-84.
75. 689 F.2d at 1190.
76. See, e.g., D&S Auto Parts, Inc., v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3846 (U.S. June 14, 1988); United Energy Owners Committee, Inc. v.
United States Energy Management Systems, Inc., 837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988); Bishop v.
Corbitt Marine Ways, 802 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1986); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793
F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986); Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986);
Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058
(1986); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Ind., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 473 U.S. 922 (1985); B.F. Hirsch, Inc., v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628
(3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984), affd per curiam on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d
478 (9th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), affid en banc in pertinent
part, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 464
U.S. 1008 (1983);
J.D. Marshall Int'l, Inc., v. Redstart, Inc., No. 86 C 371, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4826
(N.D. Ill. May 24, 1988); Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co., No. 86 5614, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5770 (E.D. La. June 10, 1988); Welek v. Solomon, 650 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Mo. 1987);
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This requirement-that for purposes of section 1962(c), the per-
son who conducts the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity and the enterprise whose affairs are so con-
ducted must be distinct entities-effectively eliminates vicarious lia-
bility from the section most frequently forming the basis of a civil
suit under RICO.77 As a result, frequently RICO is not used against
Herman v. Jefferson Bancshares, Inc., Nos. 86-4560, 87-0654, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9977
(E.D. La. Oct. 26, 1987); Waldo v. North American Van Lines, 669 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Pa.
1987); Hennessey v. Connecticut Gen'l Life Ins. Co., No. 84 C 10582 (N.D. Ill. June 18,
1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Ash v. Wallenmeyer, No. 85 C 8557
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Abelson v. Strong, 644 F.
Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1986); Gaudette v. Panos, 644 F. Supp. 826 (D. Mass. 1986); modified
on other grounds, 650 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass. 1987); Zahra v. Charles, 639 F. Supp. 1405
(E.D. Mich. 1986); Temple University v. Salla Bros., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Walso Bureau, Inc. v. Underwriters Adjusting Co., No. 85-5896 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1986)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Intre Sport, Ltd. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
625 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affid without opinion, 795 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1986);
Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, 619 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. 111. 1985); Tarasi v. Dravo
Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1235 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 1984); affid on other grounds, 805 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1986);
Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1984); Nelson v. Nat'l Republic
Bank, [1984 transfer binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,481 (N.D. III. Apr. 17, 1984);
Nelson v. Chapman & Cutler, [1984 transfer binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,808
(N.D. II. July 12, 1984); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1984 transfer binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. 1 99,674 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1984); Saine v. AIA, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Colo.
1984); Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 639, No. 83-1232 (D.D.C. June 28, 1984); Miller v.
Affiliated Financial Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 997 (N.D. III. 1984); Mancuso v. Illiott, No. 84
C 7382 (N.D. III. Aug. 29, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Kosch v.
Parkway Bank & Trust Co., No. 83 C 4832 (N.D. I11. Mar. 9, 1984) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Addis v. Moser, No. 83 C 6118 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1984); (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Milles, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1269 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Grant-
ham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., No. C 83 126 D (M.D.N.C. Apr. 17,
1984); In re Federal Bank & Trust Co. Securities Litigation, [1984 transfer binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. 91,565 (D. Or. 1984); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 581 F. Supp. 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Willamette Savings & Laon v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415
(D. Or. 1984); Wilcox Development Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 590 F. Supp. 445 (D. Or.
1984); Henry v. Kinney, [1984 transfer binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,806 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 27, 1984); Chambers Development Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 590 F.
Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Sinai v, ARCO Medical Products Co., No. C 82 4593 RPA
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 1983); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714 (D.D.C. 1983); Delery v.
Triple G Oil Co., No. 83 C 2553 (N.D. I11. Dec. 2, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file); States Security Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Bond Agency, Inc., No. 83 C 285
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); D&G Enterprises v.
Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 574 F. Supp. 263 (N.D. Ii. 1983); Barker v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Hudson v. Larouche,
579 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255
(N.D. Okla. 1983); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Action Industries
Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Va. 1983); Fields v. Nat'l Republic Bank of Chicago,
546 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. III. 1983); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20
(N.D. III. 1983); Bays v. Hunter Savings Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Van
Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
77. Hellerstein & Jacobson, Corporate Vicarious Liability Under Federal Securities,
Antitrust, and RICO Laws: Toward Imposing a Good Faith Defense Between the Plaintiff and
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while collar enterprises engaged in fraud.a
Although this requirement seems likely to remain the majority
rule in judicial treatments of the person-enterprise issue under sec-
tion 1962(c),79 it also seems to be ill-advised. In fact, one commenta-
tor has asserted that requiring such a distinction between person and
enterprise reflects a general judicial hostility to RICO rather than a
careful analysis of the problem.80
This point is well-taken. For example, such a distinction is not
needed to protect "victim" enterprises,81 who will be protected from
RICO liability by RICO's requirement of criminal intent.8 More-
over, such a rule may let the primary wrongdoer escape prosecu-
tion,83 especially because the corporation is often the central figure
(or indeed the only figure) in the enterprise. 4 In such a situation, it
seems to "defy reason" to say that the corporation cannot also be a
defendant.8' Because the corporation in many instances will indeed
be "the nucleus of the criminal amoeba, the catalyst providing im-
pulse and unity to the authors of the predicate offenses," 86 it must be
able to be cited as both the defendant "person" and the "enterprise"
under section 1962(c).
This bar to recovery against enterprise defendants is also unwise
because it permits a corporation to escape liability even if it is ac-
tively involved in the fraudulent scheme.87 Such a restriction logi-
cally would preclude both criminal sanctions and the imposition of
equitable sanctions against perpetrator corporations engaged in a
pattern of illicit activity.88 This rule would also permit such an entity
to store its ill-gotten gains in the "enterprise" for RICO purposes,
thereby shielding it from treble-damage liability. 9
Another reason often given for separating the culpable defend-
the Deep Pocket, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, CIVIL RICO: LITIGATION VS. AR-
BITRATION 77, 108 (Seminar held in Boston, Massachusetts, April 14-15, 1988). See also
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
78. Goldsmith, A Response, supra note 44, at 796; 6 RICO L. REP. 831-32 (1987).
79. McArthur & White, supra note 40, at 754.
80. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 857 n.145, 876; Goldsmith, A
Response, supra note 44, at 796 n.161.
81. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
82. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 876 & n.232.
83. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 989 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1170 (1983).
84. Id. at 989.
85. Id.
86. Note, supra note 39, at 521-22.
87. McArthur & White, supra note 40, at 755.
88. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 876 & n.233.
89. McArthur & White, supra note 40, at 754-55 & n.67.
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ants from the enterprise under section 1962(c) when the enterprise is
a legitimate business entity is the desirability of shielding the corpo-
rate defendant from treble damages and from being branded as a
"racketeer" solely on the basis of its employees' fraud.90 It is un-
clear, however, why corporations which are exposed to multiple or
exemplary damages for their employees' conduct under other com-
mon-law theories9 and statutes92 should be shielded from such lia-
bility under RICO. 3 Such a shield seems particularly inappropriate
when it is often true that the corporate facade is the primary reason
that the defendants' fraudulent scheme succeeded in the first place. 94
Moreover, any required distinction between person and enter-
prise is also vulnerable to clever pleading tactics by plaintiffs. 5 In
fact, many of the machinations surrounding the pleading of an enter-
prise which are apparent and troublesome in RICO cases are a re-
sult of the imposition of the requirement of a distinct person and
enterprise under section 1962(c).96 Such tactics are contrary to con-
siderations of judicial economy. 7 This requirement seems all the
more unwise as the drafter of RICO probably did not intend the
distinction.9" In addition, the primary justifications usually given for
derivative corporate liability in general, that of risk allocation princi-
ples and the desire to encourage commercial enterprises to supervise
their employees closely,9  apply equally well in the RICO context in
general and to section 1962(c) in particular.
The inquiry into whether a particular defendant should be held
90. See, e.g.. Report to the House of Delegates, A.B.A. SEC. OF CRIM. JUSTICE, Section
I (commentary) (1982); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
91. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556, 569 (1982) (vicarious liability principles applicable under antitrust laws). See also infra
notes 109, 136-47 and accompanying text.
93. See McArthur & White, supra note 40, at 755.
94. Id.
95. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059-60 (8th Cir. 1982) (outlining how to
plead around distinction); Cumulative Decision Index, 4 RICO L. REP. 24, 31 (1986) (citing
cases pleading around distinction); Blakey, supra note 38, at 324-25 (policy sometimes sup-
ports treating enterprise as person; because this result "may be achieved by artful pleading,
requiring the plaintiff to plead a "person" separate from the "enterprise" can be seen to be
artificial"); Moran, supra note 38, at 778 & n.259 (because of uncertainty regarding whether
legal entity can be named as both enterprise and defendant, "better practice is to name the
legal entity as a defendant, and to allege an associational enterprise formed by the entity and
the individual defendants"); McArthur & White, supra note 40, at 754-55 nn.67, 69 (citing
cases pleading around distinction and commenting thereon); Goldsmith, A Response, supra
note 44, at 796 (citing cases pleading around distinction); Note, supra note 39, at 514 n.57,
520 n.77 (citing cases advising this tactic and commenting thereon).
96. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 161 n.255.
97. Note, supra note 39, at 518 n.71.
98. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 877.
99. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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vicariously liable currently focuses primarily on whether that defend-
ant is best situated to prevent accidents, to bear the cost of acci-
dents, and to promote an optimal allocation of productive resources
by being forced to bear the costs associated with accidents.1"' As
between the business entity and the injured plaintiff, the corporation
obviously is better able to prevent or absorb any loss.10' The corpora-
tion is also often the only party in a position to police and deter the
illegal conduct." 2
Other considerations in favor of holding the corporate enterprise
liable for the acts of its agents or employees in the section 1962(c)
context include: allocating the risk of loss to persons who can exer-
cise choice and control in corporate governance; encouraging private
enforcement actions when a legitimate enterprise is being turned to
corruption; and encouraging shareholders to insist on procedures to
prevent such corporate activities. Corporate liability also ensures full
compensation for victims of these activities, makes available deriva-
tive suits on behalf of the corporation or shareholders against direc-
tors, and holds the corporate entity liable as a separate person, bal-
ancing many of the advantages of legal personhood that have inured
to its benefit.'0 3
In view of these considerations, it appears that the policies un-
derlying both RICO and derivative corporate liability argue in favor
of civil RICO liability for an "enterprise" which is also a "person"
pursuing its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activities. In
such a situation, the peculiar structure of section 1962(c) and the
use of the words "person" and "enterprise" should not be employed
to make culpable enterprises immune from civil RICO claims. 04
Moreover, neither the language of the statute nor its legislative his-
tory suggests that the ordinary rules of agency law, including liabil-




Therefore, the person/enterprise structure of section 1962(c)
should not be seen to have changed the ordinary common law rules
100. Note, Real Persons, Corporate Persons and Vicarious Liability, 38 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 453, 467 & nn.78-80 (1988).
101. Id. at 467-69; McArthur & White, supra note 40, at 755.
102. McArthur & White, supra note 40, at 755.
103. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 375-76; Majority Response to
Separate Statement of Richard Nathan, Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at
425.
104. The Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 376-77 makes this point and
recommends "that the RICO statute be amended to make clear that the use of the words
"person" and "enterprise" in Section 1962(c) is not intended to make culpable enterprises
immune from civil RICO claims."
105. Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 3, at 345.
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governing the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent. 106 Pri-
vate plaintiffs should be permitted to allege a legitimate business en-
tity as both the defendant person and the enterprise under that sec-
tion of RICO.
(b) Alleging vicarious liability of the corporation under
RICO for statutory violations of agents and employees.-Private
plaintiffs who are trying to reach the corporate pocket through
RICO sometimes take a different approach than that just described
by alleging that the corporation is vicariously liable under RICO for
the acts of its agents and employees under traditional principles of
respondeat superior.10 7 Thus, the issue raised in this context is
whether these traditional standards should apply to civil RICO
claims so as to make a legitimate business vicariously liable for
treble damages based on the misconduct of lower-level employees." 8
Unfortunately, the court decisions on this issue are widely
divergent. 10 9
Five different approaches to the issue can be identified from the
court decisions."' First, some courts have taken a broad view of the
propriety of vicarious liability and have held that a legitimate busi-
ness may be liable under the common law doctrine of respondeat
superior for RICO damages just as for other types of damages."'
106. Id. at 347. See also supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these rules.
107. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9 (1982);
Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 3, at 342; Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 875.
109. Most courts confronting the respondeat superior issue under RICO look to Ameri-
can Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 569 (1982),
in which the United States Supreme Court held that traditional principles of respondeat supe-
rior applied under the federal antitrust laws because Congress never evinced a contrary intent.
However, when trying to apply this principle to RICO, the courts have disagreed about
whether Congress intended for respondeat superior to apply under RICO. Compare Schofield
v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32 (Ist Cir. 1986) ("there is unlikely to be a situation,
in the absence of an express statement, in which Congress more clearly indicates that respon-
deat superior is contrary to its intent") and D&S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964,
968 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3846 (U.S. June 14, 1988) (RICO "does indi-
cate Congressional intent to create an exception to the general rule of respondeat superior")
with Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984) ("1 perceive nothing in
RICO or its legislative history which would suggest that the normal rules of agency law should
not apply to the civil liability created by the statute.").
110. This analytic framework is based on Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 31, at 4.
Ill. See, e.g., Connors v. Lexington Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Fed-
eral Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1331 (D.P.R.
1987); Tryco Trucking Co., Inc. v. Belk Store Services, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D.N.C.
1986); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798 (D. Md. 1985); Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F.
Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984). See also Moran, supra note 38, at 776 n.251 (recognizing the
applicability of doctrine of apparent authority and respondeat superior to RICO to make prin-
cipal liable for racketeering acts of agent which are within scope of its actual or apparent
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Under these decisions a legitimate business is liable for treble dam-
ages under RICO even when its employee acted solely for his own
benefit, perhaps even against company policy, so long 'as he acted
with apparent authority.
112
Second, some courts have narrowed the permissible range of vi-
carious liability under RICO and have permitted the imposition of
vicarious liability when the employee or agent acted within the scope
of his employment with at least a partial intention to benefit the em-
ployer.113 This is essentially the standard for vicarious criminal lia-
bility that the federal courts have traditionally imposed on organiza-
tions, although that standard has been liberalized in recent years.1 4
The third approach which courts have taken is to impose vicari-
ous liability under RICO only when the criminal activity involved
high-level corporate agents or employees. Such high-level involve-
ment is said to demonstrate that the organization itself actively par-
ticipated in the alleged racketeering activity, 5 and may function to
turn the criminal behavior into conduct of the corporation itself.'
Fourth, some courts analyze the vicarious liability issue with
reference to the person/enterprise debate discussed above. These
courts hold that while an enterprise cannot also be a culpable person,
and therefore cannot be a defendant under section 1962(c) of the
authority "notwithstanding the fact that the principal might not have participated in or di-
rectly benefited from the racketeering activity").
112. See supra notes 18, 25 and accompanying text. See also Moran, supra note 38, at
776 n.251.
113. See. e.g., D&S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, No. 82 C 5279 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3,
1985), aff'd in pertinent part, 838 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3846
(U.S. June 14, 1988); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986); Wagman v.
FSC Securities Corp., 1985 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,445 (N.D. III. July 23, 1985); In re Olym-
pia Brewing Co. Securities Litigation, (N.D. III. Dec. 18, 1984) (available on LEXIS Genfed
library, Dist file) (applying respondeat superior in the subsection (a) context, but implying
that it is equally applicable to subsection (c)).
114. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 343-45. However, the Task
Force Report notes also that the view that a corporation will be held vicariously liable only if
its agent acted with intent to benefit the corporation may not be uniformly accepted, id. at
344-45.
115. See, e.g., Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. 679 F. Supp. 165, 181 (D.
Conn. 1987); Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., No. 85 C 4375, (N.D. III. Jan.
22, 1987) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 11984 Transfer binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,509 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 1984);
Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
116. See, e.g., Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 31, at 4; Civil RICO Task Force Report,
supra note 20, at 374. However, it has also been said that such a situation does not involve a
question of vicarious liability at all, but direct liability of the corporation for the misdeeds; see.
e.g., Note, Judicial Efforts to Redirect An Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the Misapplica-
tion of Vicarious Corporate Liability, 65 B.U.L. REV. 561, 600-01 (1985); D&S Auto Parts v.
Schwartz, 828 F.2d 964, 967-68 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3846 (U.S. June
14, 1988); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 33 (Ist Cir. 1986).
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statute,""7 an enterprise can be alleged to be both the defendant per-
son and the enterprise under sections 1962(a) and 1962(b) of
RICO."1' Under this theory, these courts have applied common law
principles of vicarious liability to hold corporations liable for acts of
employees and agents under sections 1962(a) and 1962(b), but have
been unwilling to do so under section 1962(c).
Finally, some courts have completely rejected the use of respon-
deat superior in the RICO context. These courts assert that RICO
aims at punishing the individual wrongdoer rather than the enter-
prise. 1"' Some of these decisions also warn that permitting the use of
respondeat superior in this context would allow a plaintiff to circum-
vent the required person-enterprise distinction which courts have
seen fit to impose." 0
117. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
118. See. e.g, D&S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3846 (U.S. June 14, 1988); United Energy Owners Committee, Inc. v.
United States Energy Management Systems, Inc., 837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988); Petro-Tech,
Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793
F.2d 28 (Ist Cir. 1986); Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d
1393 (9th Cir. 1986); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th
Cir. 1984); Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Intre Sport Ltd. v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Abelson
v. Strong, 644 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass. 1986). However, there are logistical problems involved
in the pleading of a case under section 1962(a). See, e.g., Civil RICO Task Force Report.
supra note 20, at 376-77 (section 1962(a) not coextensive with section 1962(c) in reaching
unlawful activity; culpable organizations could perhaps avoid liability because of limits on ap-
plicability of section 1962(a)); Hellerstein & Jacobson, supra note 77, at 112 ("major prob-
lem" before civil RICO plaintiff can use section 1962(a) to reach corporate pocket; to wit,
satisfaction of proximate cause and damage requirements in showing causal relationship be-
tween investment or use of racketeering proceeds in an enterprise and his injury); Note, supra
note 116, at 596-97 ("limiting corporation liability to [1962(a)] would require a demonstration
of the source and disposition of illegal income, a significant added burden for the plaintiff;"
might also encourage organized crime to function through corrupt but RICO-immune corpora-
tions; and would eliminate cases in which racketeering did not result in acquisition of funds
and eliminate corporate liability for participation in pattern of racketeering activities); Lynch,
RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal. Parts I & II, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 661, 691 & n.139
(1987) (section 1962(a) requires proof of use of proceeds from racketeering to invest in a
legitimate enterprise, presenting an "extremely difficult and burdensome" task for plaintiffs);
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 401, 420-21
& nn. 1235-36 (1984) (section 1962(a) poses evidentiary problems "because the income must
be traced from the racketeering activity to the principal's investment in the enterprise through
the defendant's typically inadequate or doctored records. Due to these evidentiary limitations,
prosecutors rarely invoke section 1962(a).").
119. D&G Enterprises v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 574 F. Supp. 263, 270 (N.D.
III. 1983) (RICO does not hold the enterprise liable, but only persons who participated in its
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity).
120. See, e.g., Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1987); Brent Liquid
Transp., inc. v. GATX Leasing Corp., 650 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Banque Worms v.
Luis A. Dque Pena e Hijos, Ltd., 652 F. Supp. 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Gaudette v. Panos, 644
F. Supp. 826 (D. Mass. 1986); Continental Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432
(E.D. Pa. 1986); Lynn Elecs. v. Automation Mach & Dev. Corp., No. 86 2301 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
6, 1986); Walso Bureau, Inc. v. Underwriters Adjusting Co., No. 85 5896 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14,
1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 628
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One of the first decisions to directly address the question of re-
spondeat superior liability under RICO is Parnes v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc.121 In Parnes, a securities case, the plaintiffs alleged
that they had been damaged by the fraudulent trading practices of
two of the defendant's employee-brokers. The plaintiffs sued the bro-
kerage house, Heinold Commodities, Inc., under section 1962 of
RICO, alleging that it was equally responsible with the errant bro-
kers for the damages they had suffered.
Refusing to impute to the corporation the criminal acts of the
two broker-employees, the court asserted:
that sort of respondeat superior application, perhaps permissible
to establish ordinary civil liability, would be bizarre indeed as a
means to warp the facts alleged in this case into the RICO
mold. Under that theory malefactors at a low corporate level
could thrust treble damage liability on a wholly unwitting corpo-
rate management and shareholders. 2 '
The next significant RICO opinion dealing with respondeat su-
perior liability was Dakis v. Chapman.23 The plaintiff in Dakis al-
leged that the defendants' broker-employee had "churned" her late
husband's account and caused substantial losses by doing so. The
court held that the plaintiff's RICO claim must fail because it al-
leged only respondeat superior liability on the part of the brokerage
houses.124 The court recognized that the firms would have respon-
deat superior liability under the securities laws, but was unwilling to
extend such liability to RICO claims, 25 holding that "it is necessary
that whomever is to be held liable under RICO has him(it)self been
actively engaged in the pattern of racketeering." '26
As one commentator has pointed out, rejection of respondeat
superior liability in these cases "seems an abrupt departure from
modern tort principles." 2' The court's refusal to apply respondeat
F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Kredietbank N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc., I Civ. RICO REP.
(BNA) 7 (Oct. 30, 1985) (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file), aff d mem., 808 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1986); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco,
Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Addis v. Moser, No. 83 C 6118 (N.D. I11. Feb. 15,
1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,
548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. I11. 1982). See also Separate Statement of Richard E. Nathan, Civil
RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 342-43.
121. 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
122. 548 F. Supp. at 24 n.9.
123. 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
124. 574 F. Supp. at 759.
125. 574 F. Supp. at 760.
126. 574 F. Supp. at 760.
127. Black, supra note 46, at 836. See also supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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superior seems questionable in view of RICO's liberal construction
clause. 28 The policies of loss distribution and deterrence which un-
derlie respondeat superior are well-served by its application to
RICO.'29 In addition, the availability of respondeat superior under
the federal securities laws for the predicate offenses of churning and
suitability 30 make the rejection of that doctrine in a RICO case
anomalous.
A third case specifically discussing vicarious liability under
RICO is Bernstein v. IDT Corporation.'3' In Bernstein, the trustee
in bankruptcy of Frigitemp, Inc. sued General Dynamics Corpora-
tion and various individual defendants, claiming that they had looted
Frigitemp by demanding kickbacks and illegal rebates in exchange
for subcontract work at General Dynamics' Quincy Shipyard. The
complaint alleged that the culpable acts of bribery and extortion
were committed by senior officers of General Dynamics in the course
of their employment, thus exposing General Dynamics to vicarious
liability for the resulting damage.
The RICO count of the complaint alleged a violation of section
1962(c), claiming that General Dynamics and two of its corporate
officers conducted the affairs of General Dynamics through a pattern
of racketeering activity. 32 The court found that General Dynamics
could be held liable under RICO for violations committed by its of-
ficers using the normal rules of agency law:
When conduct is proscribed by a federal statute and civil
liability for that conduct is explicitly or implicitly imposed, the
normal rules of agency law apply in the absence of some indica-
tion that Congress had a contrary intent . . . . I perceive noth-
ing in RICO or its legislative history which would suggest that
the normal rules of agency not apply to the civil liability created
by that statute. To the contrary . . . it appears to me that appli-
cation of the doctrines of apparent authority and respondeat su-
perior will, at least in most instances, further the statutory
goals.' 33
The court added in a footnote that if General Dynamics were civilly
responsible for the conduct of its two officers, it could be required to
128. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
129. Black, supra note 46, at 836.
130. Id.; Note, supra note 116, at 605; Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 679 F.
Supp. 165, 181 (D. Conn. 1987).
131. 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984).
132. 582 F. Supp. at 1082.
133. 582 F. Supp. at 1083-84 (citations omitted).
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pay treble damages.13 4
In discussing vicarious civil RICO liability, the Bernstein court
placed substantial reliance on RICO's closest analog-the antitrust
laws.13 5 It cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in
American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.'
and analogized the application of respondeat superior in a treble
damages antitrust suit to a civil RICO action." 7 In Hydrolevel,
treble damages were sought under the antitrust laws against a non-
profit association (ASME) for the actions of agents who were unpaid
volunteers. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether ASME
could be held liable under the antitrust laws for the acts of these
agents, who were acting with apparent rather than actual or implied
authority. "'
The Court concluded that the fundamental question presented
in Hydrolevel was whether the well-recognized rule that a principal
is responsible for the acts of his agents done within the scope of the
agent's authority was "consistent with the intent behind the antitrust
laws."13 9 The Court used "reasoning that is strikingly apt in the con-
text of civil RICO '" 0 to hold that the antitrust laws contemplate
vicarious liability of a principal for the acts of his agent done with
apparent authority."'
Looking to the Congressional intent behind the antitrust stat-
utes, the Court noted that absent any indication that the law was not
intended to reach that far, the antitrust action should be at least as
broad as the plaintiff's right to sue for analogous torts.142 Reviewing
the legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress' desire
that the antitrust laws sweep broadly would be furthered by allowing
the apparent authority rule to apply in such cases. " "
The Court found that the threat of vicarious civil liability under
the antitrust laws would have a deterrent effect in the industry. Such
a threat would create a powerful incentive for ASME to take "steps
to make improper conduct on the part of all its agents unlikely.'4
134. Id. at 1084 n.3.
135. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980).
136. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
137. 582 F. Supp. at 1083.
138. 456 U.S. at 558-59.
139. 456 U.S. at 570.
140. Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 3, at 336.
141. 456 U.S. at 570.
142. 456 U.S. at 569.
143. 456 U.S. at 573 n.l .
144. 456 U.S. at 572.
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The Court also held that vicarious civil liability under the antitrust
laws should not be limited to situations in which the agent acts to
benefit his principal. 145 Moreover, the Court concluded that treble
damage liability of a principal for the acts of his agent done with
apparent authority was warranted on the ground that treble damages
deter violations, compensate victims, and counterbalance the diffi-
culty of maintaining a private suit under the antitrust laws.146 Fi-
nally, the Court rejected ASME's argument that it should not be
held liable unless it ratified the actions of its agents, stating that
such a rule would allow ASME to "avoid liability by ensuring that it
remained ignorant of its agents' conduct." 47
The Bernstein court's reliance on the Supreme Court's
Hydrolevel decision is well-placed. Most of the policy arguments for
vicarious antitrust liability made by the majority in Hydrolevel can
be made with equal force under civil RICO. 48 First, the vicarious
liability of a corporation for the acts of its agents and employees is
well-established at common law, even when those acts are ultra vires
of the corporation. 49 Second, vicarious liability will function equally
as well under RICO as under the antitrust laws to influence corpora-
tions to supervise their employees. The need to induce corporate re-
sponsibility is surely as great with respect to RICO violations as it is
in the antitrust area. Furthermore, as between innocent victims and
a principal with supervisory responsibility, fairness mandates impos-
ing the risk of loss on the latter.""
In addition, each of the statutory arguments for vicarious anti-
trust liability have an analog under RICO. The intended broad
sweep of the antitrust laws referred to by the Supreme Court in
Hydrolevel is at least duplicated in RICO. Not only is RICO "a
foster child of the antitrust statutes,"' 5' but Congress also added to
RICO an express provision, which had not been added to the anti-
trust laws, calling for the liberal construction of RICO to achieve its
remedial purposes. 52
From an economic standpoint, vicarious liability under both the
antitrust laws and RICO is justified because the corporation is best
145. 456 U.S. at 573-74.
146. 456 U.S. at 575-76 (citations omitted).
147. 456 U.S. at 573.
148. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 658 F. Supp.
1331, 1341 (D.P.R. 1987).
149. Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 3, at 338.
150. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 877.
151. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 351.
152. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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able to spread the risk of loss from anticompetitive behavior as well
as from racketeering activity by corporate agents. Further, the treble
damage provisions of both the antitrust laws and RICO will provide
an even stronger incentive to private litigants if vicarious liability is
available. It is through vicarious liability that such plaintiffs will be
able to reach into the deep corporate pocket.
In sum, then, it seems accurate to say that "[v]icarious and en-
tity civil liability and criminal responsibility are well-established
principles in federal jurisprudence; they should also serve well in im-
plementing RICO's broad remedial purposes."15 As a "bulwark
against institutional misconduct," 151 respondeat superior liability is
clearly warranted in the RICO context.
IV. A Proposed Standard for Vicarious Civil RICO Liability of the
Legitimate Business Entity
After deciding that derivative liability of the business entity is
appropriate under civil RICO, the next step is to decide upon the
appropriate theory of liability to be used and the measure of dam-
ages to be imposed upon the corporation. The ordinary federal rules
of respondeat superior'55 will govern the corporation's liability for
the actual damages for offenses committed by its agents and employ-
ees. These acts may also be predicate offenses under RICO. 56 The
RICO statute and legislative history, however, are silent on the issue
of vicarious treble damage liability57 and, as was demonstrated
above, "the case law on this issue is in disarray."158
The use of respondeat superior under RICO should not be left
to haphazard judicial development in the lower courts. 159 It appears,
though, that the United States Supreme Court is unwilling to settle
the disagreement among the circuits. The Court recently declined to
review a case that squarely presented the issue of vicarious treble
damage liability under RICO."'
Several legislators and many commentators have proposed solu-
153. Blakey, supra note 38, at 323.
154. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 855.
155. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
156. See Hellerstein & Jacobson, supra note 77, at 115 n. 100; Civil RICO Task Force
Report, supra note 20, at 360; Note, supra note 116, at 605; Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Sec.
Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165, 181 (D. Conn. 1987).
157. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
158. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 360.
159. Id.
160. D&S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 56
U.S.L.W. 3846 (U.S. June 14, 1988) (presenting issue of whether doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior is applicable to civil RICO actions).
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tions to the issue of the propriety of vicarious RICO liability. These
proposals are reviewed below; then, another standard for liability is
proposed.
A. Legislators and Commentators Address the Issue
Two commentators have proposed that section 1964(c) of
RICO, which authorizes private civil RICO actions for treble dam-
ages,161 be amended to prohibit completely vicarious treble damage
liability under the statute. One of these commentators advocates a
prohibition of the use of any vicarious liability doctrine, including
respondeat superior, to impose liability for treble damages.162 The
other commentator suggests an amendment of section 1964(c) to ex-
plicitly state that a legitimate entity may never be held to have vio-
lated RICO or be liable for treble damages under its provisions."6 3
This latter proposal would include a prohibition on the use of vicari-
ous liability principles against the legitimate business entity.
Other proposals, however, would permit some use of vicarious
liability principles under civil RICO. At least one civil RICO reform
bill introduced in Congress has sought to severely restrict the use of
vicarious liability against the legitimate entity, 64 while several other
reform bills have been silent on the issue."65 For example, in July of
1986, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice proposed a civil RICO reform bill, 66 H.R. 5445, which
would have restricted severely vicarious liability under RICO.'
H.R. 5445 would have effectively eliminated respondeat supe-
rior as a basis for RICO liability by limiting enterprise liability to
cases in which an executive officer or governing board authorized or
ratified the criminal acts. 6 ' The restrictive respondeat superior 1an-
161. This section reads as follows:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
]18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
162. Anderson, Problems of Private RICO Remedies and Suggested Legislative Solu-
tions, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 30, col. 3.
163. Separate Statement of Richard E. Nathan, Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra
note 20, at 407, 421, 422 n.668.
164. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
166. See House Subcommittee Approves Bill Eliminating RICO's Treble Damage Pro-
vision, 2 Civ. RICO REP. (BNA) at 2 (Aug. 20, 1986).
167. See Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform. supra note 23, at 855, app. at 904-06.
168. See id. at 856, app. at 905. As Mr. Goldsmith points out, if one views the authori-
zation of criminal violations as a basis for direct rather than vicarious liability, this version of
H.R. 5445 "'would have limited vicarious liability to the rare situations involving ratification."
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guage found in this original version of the bill received strong criti-
cism'69 and was not included in the revised version of H.R. 5445.170
This revised version, which was silent on the issue of vicarious liabil-
ity under RICO, passed the House of Representatives, 17 1 but was
tabled in the Senate by a 47-44 vote.'
7 2
Several other currently pending RICO reform bills are also si-
lent on the issue of the use of respondeat superior in RICO actions.
Bills introduced by Representative John Conyers (D-Mich) 73 and by
Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)174 during 1987 did not ad-
dress the issue."' So-called "compromise" bills introduced on June
28, 1988, by Representatives Boucher176 and Conyers17 7 also make
no mention of the issue.
78
One commentator has criticized the approach of the revised ver-
sion of H.R. 5445 (and, implicitly, the other reform bills which are
silent on the issue of vicarious civil RICO liability) and suggests a
limited use of respondeat superior which he terms "a compromise
designed to make RICO less threatening to institutional busi-
nesses. 179 He has proposed that respondeat superior liability be ap-
plied to civil RICO, but only for actual damages. Only when the
board of directors, a partner, or a high managerial agent of the prin-
cipal, acting within the scope of employment, authorized, ratified, or
recklessly tolerated the pattern of racketeering activity'"0 would the
Id. at 856. In addition, the bill required that the "conduct complained of" must have been
"intended to benefit, and did benefit [the principal]." H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132
CONG. REC. H9365-66 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986).
169. See Celebrezze, Keep RICO Intact: It's Working Well, Legal Times, Oct. 6, 1986,
at 17, col. I.
170. See Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 878, app. at 907-11. Mr.
Goldsmith suggests that Congressman Boucher, the sponsor of both versions of H.R. 5445, is
trying to "legislate indirectly a result he could not achieve directly" by this tactic, in that
Boucher advocates that the current trend in the law, which generally rejects respondeat supe-
rior, be continued without congressional action, id. at 877-78.
171. 132 CONG. REC. H9365-66 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986).
172. See 132 CONG. REC. S16,704 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986).
173. H.R. 3240, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H7406 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
1987).
174. S. 1523, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S10,497, 10,501-03 (daily ed.
July 22, 1987).
175. 3 Civ. RICO REP. (BNA) at I (Feb. 9, 1988).
176. H.R. 4923, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H4833 (daily ed. June 28,
1988).
177. H.R. 4920, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H4832 (daily ed. June 28,
1988).
178. 4 Civ. RICO REP. (BNA) at 5 (July 5, 1988).
179. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 877.
180. Id. at 874, 877. Mr. Goldsmith's proposed amendment to section 1964(c) of RICO
reads as follows:
(6) In all actions arising under this subsection, a principal is liable for ac-
tual damages for harm caused by an agent acting within the scope of either his
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principal be liable for double damages.181
This standard of applying respondeat superior to make a legiti-
mate entity liable under civil RICO only if high-level officials of the
firm approved or had knowledge of the racketeering activity is one
probably derived from the Model Penal Code 8 2 and is found in the
proposals of several other commentators. For example, the Task
Force on Civil RICO of the American Bar Association Section of
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law has recommended that re-
spondeat superior be applied in civil RICO cases to make legitimate
businesses liable for treble damages only when high-level managerial
agents or top officers or directors of the corporation were directly
involved in or knew of the racketeering activities.183 Similarly, other
commentators have suggested that "[i]t is appropriate to hold a cor-
poration criminally and civilly liable for the predicate acts and a
RICO violation when . . . the corporation acquiesced in or author-
ized the actions of its agents in furtherance of corporate business,"' "
or "when its high-level managerial agents, officers of [sic] directors
are directly involved with the alleged criminal activity or they ex-
pressly approve such activity by their underlings." 8 "
Other commentators have chosen not to limit the vicarious civil
RICO liability of the corporate entity to situations when high-level
corporate actors take part. One commentator has asserted that "[i]f
the entity participates in or directly benefits from the racketeering
activity, it should be named as a defendant" under respondeat supe-
rior or vicarious liability principles, and that when the entity "has
acted or participated in or benefitted [indirectly] from the pattern of
racketeering activit[y]," it may also be permissible to allege such
employment or apparent authority. A principal is liable for double damages only
if the pattern of illicit activity was authorized, ratified, or recklessly tolerated by




182. See MODEL PENAL CODE Section 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Gold-
smith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 361; Note, supra note 116, at 600 & n.255.
183. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 364-65, 431-32. The one excep-
tion to this rule which is advocated by the Task Force is that "actual damage derivative or
respondeat superior liability should exist in the limited circumstances where there exists a
distinct RICO injury for which no compensation is available in claims based upon the individ-
ual criminal acts that constitute the predicate offenses." Id.
184. Note, supra note 116, at 601. However, the author of this Note terms this direct,
and not vicarious, corporate responsibility. Id. at 600-01.
185. Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 31, at 4. However, these commentators also assert
that this is not a situation involving vicarious responsibility, but one in which the alter ego of
the organization has made the organization itself corrupt, id.
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liability.186 Going further, another commentator has asserted that
when the agent of a legal entity commits racketeering acts that fall
within the scope of its actual or apparent authority, the principal can
be named as a defendant under section 1962(c) of RICO pursuant to
the doctrines of apparent authority and respondeat superior, "not-
withstanding the fact that the principal might not have participated
in or directly benefitted from the racketeering activity.1 8
7
Another proposal advocates amending section 1962(c) of RICO
to explicitly provide for vicarious liability, but also suggests making
available a good faith defense for the corporate enterprise that dili-
gently supervised its agents and employees. 8 a The authors of this
proposal contend that such a defense will provide the corporate em-
ployer with an incentive to supervise and will therefore better protect
the public than traditional agency principles, which make the corpo-
rate employer strictly liable notwithstanding its diligence."8 9
Professor Robert Blakey, one of the drafters of RICO and an
influential commentator on the statute, has chosen instead to focus
on the role of the enterprise in order to determine when vicarious
liability should arise under RICO. He asserts that in some situations,
attributing civil or criminal liability to the enterprise for the conduct
of a person violating RICO is justified, while in other situations such
attribution "would be perverse. '" 90 After describing the possible
roles of the enterprise as "prize," "instrument," "victim," and "per-
petrator,"' 91 Blakey advocates no vicarious liability whatsoever when
the enterprise is either a prize or a victim. He suggests vicarious civil
and criminal liability when the enterprise is a perpetrator; and civil,
but not criminal, vicarious liability when the enterprise is an
instrument.' 92
B. A Simple Standard for Imposing Vicarious Civil RICO
Liability
As outlined above, the judiciary is generally reluctant to apply
186. Duval, A Trial Lawyer's Guide: Everything You Always Wanted to Know About
RICO Before Your Case Was Dismissed, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 291, 316 n.1 10.
187. Moran, supra note 38, at 776 n.251. In fact, Moran describes this as an "important
exception" to the principle that an entity which did not participate in or directly benefit from
racketeering activity should not be named as a defendant under section 1962(c). Id. at 775-76
& n.251.
188. Hellerstein & Jacobson, supra note 77, at 79-81, 115-16.
189. Id. at 80.
190. Blakey, supra note 38, at 290 & n.151.
191. See id. at 307.
192. Id. at 323-24.
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respondeat superior to civil RICO.193 Some courts and most com-
mentators would prefer to apply it, if at all, only in situations in
which the corporation, through its high-level employees or agents,
actively participated in or knew about the racketeering activities
which have occurred. 94 This judicial reluctance probably stems from
"both a hostility to RICO" in general, 96 and a conviction "that re-
spondeat superior ought not be a basis for treble damage
liability."' 96
Such hostility, however, is misplaced. RICO is here to stay, and
Congress is charged with the task of amending the statute if it is to
be amended. 197 Moreover, neither the language of the RICO statute
nor its legislative history suggests that the ordinary rules of
agency-including vicarious liability rules-have been displaced by
RICO. 98 The provision making the corporation liable for treble
damages can be supported on several grounds.
First, civil RICO's treble damage and counsel fee provision'99
encourages remedial litigation by private plaintiffs.200 Because com-
plex fraud investigations into corporate white-collar crime often re-
quire resources that government prosecutors do not have,20' private
attorneys general serve a critical supplementary function. Second,
private treble damage actions also promote deterrence to a greater
extent than actions seeking only actual damages. Few miscreants are
193. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text. See also Schofield v. First Com-
modity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32-34 (lst Cir. 1986) (noting majority view).
194. See supra notes 115-16, 123-26 and accompanying text.
195. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23, at 856, 876; Goldsmith, A Re-
sponse, supra note 44, at 796 n.161.
196. Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform, supra note 23; at 856; Dwyer & Kiely, supra note
3, at 342; Parines v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9 (D. III. 1982).
197. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) ("It is true that
private civil actions under the statute are being brought almost solely against such defendants,
rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet this defect-if defect it is-is
inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress. It is not for the
judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it simply
because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult applications.") (footnote
omitted).
198. Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 3, at 345, 347; Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp.
1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra note 161.
200. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) (noting that private
attorney general provision and treble damages provision support legislative purpose to en-
courage civil litigation). See also Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 425
(treble damages liability a means to create incentives to undertake costs and risks of litigation
when public policy calls for private involvement to supplement limited public law enforcement
resources).
201. See, e.g., H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT, AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME 8 (1970) (the prevention, deterrence, investigation, and prosecution of white-
collar crime must compete with other interests for allocation of scarce law enforcement dollars
.. ." .
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deterred by the possibility that in the rare event of litigation limited
to actual damages, they merely will have to part with their ill-gotten
gains.20 2 In addition, treble damages serve the socially desirable
function of compensating victims,203 and are especially appropriate
as RICO violators have, by definition, engaged in a pattern of con-
tinuous criminal activity.
2 04
Vicarious civil liability under RICO can also be supported on
policy grounds. Both criminal and civil vicarious liability are well-
established and broadly applied in American jurisprudence, 20 5 even
as a basis for assessing punitive damages.2 " Further, there is no rea-
son to separate RICO from other theories of liability in which corpo-
rations are exposed to multiple or exemplary damages for their em-
ployees' conduct.2 0
With regard to the propriety of derivative liability under RICO
specifically, neither the language nor the legislative history of the
statute suggests that the ordinary rules of agency law, including lia-
bility rules, have been displaced by RICO.2 0 8 The statute is silent on
the issue of vicarious liability, and the assumption must be that the
standard for such liability is that which would otherwise apply under
existing criminal and civil law. 20' Moreover, Congress purposely ap-
pended a liberal construction clause to RICO to ensure that the law
would be generously applied to achieve its remedial purposes.2 10
The application of the doctrine of respondeat superior will gen-
erally further the remedial purposes of RICO2 1 I and Congress' de-
sire that RICO sweep broadly. 2 Moreover, both the policy argu-
202. See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 415 (1986) (statement of the National Association of Attorneys
General and National District Attorneys Association):
If our society authorizes the recovery of only actual damages for deliberate
anti-social conduct engaged in for profit, it lets the perpetrator know that if he is
caught, he need only return the misappropriated sums. If he is not caught, he
may keep his ill-gotten gains, and even if he is caught and sued, he knows that
he may be able to defeat part of the damages claim or at least compromise it. In
short, the balance of risk under traditional simple damage recovery provides lit-
tle disincentive to those who engage in such conduct.
203. Cf. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985) (treble damages serve compensatory function in antitrust context).
204. RICO liability is limited by the statute to persons who have engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962 (1982).
205. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 27, 40 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 105-33 and accompanying text.
209. Civil RICO Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 352.
210. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
211. Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083-84 (D. Del. 1984).
212. Cf. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 573
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ments and the statutory arguments made by the Supreme Court in
favor of vicarious antitrust liability in the Hydrolevel opinion213 can
be made with equal force under civil RICO.214 Finally, the primary
justifications usually given for derivative corporate liability in gen-
eral, risk allocation and deterrence, 1 5 apply equally well in the spe-
cific RICO context.
The use of vicarious liability principles in the context of civil
RICO suits ought to be based upon the plain language of the RICO
statute and upon Congress' express direction that RICO should be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.2"' Congress
did not even hint that the usual rules of derivative liability should
not apply under RICO, and it defined the culpable person for pur-
poses of RICO to specifically include business entities.2" Legitimate
business entities, therefore, should be vicariously liable under civil
RICO whenever they would be vicariously liable under general prin-
ciples of respondeat superior:21 8 whenever an agent of the entity acts
with apparent authority or an employee of the entity acts within the
scope of his employment.
Section 1964(c) of the RICO statute should be amended by
Congress to state explicitly that a person, as broadly defined in the
statute to include an entity, is vicariously liable for treble damages
for injury to person or property caused by its agent acting with ap-
parent authority or by its employee acting within the scope of his
employment. Such a provision would impliedly incorporate existing
rules of vicarious liability, making the principal vicariously liable for
treble damages. Congress chose this remedy to compensate victims
of racketeering activity, encourage private enforcement of RICO's
provisions, and deter further racketeering activity. The proposed
amendment is:
Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c) is amended to read as
follows:
(6) In all actions arising under this subsection, a person, as
defined in section 1961(3) of this chapter, is liable for treble
damages and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attor-
n.I I (1982) (noting that Congress' desire that antitrust laws sweep broadly would be furthered
by allowing use of apparent authority rule).
213. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
214. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for the statutory citation and definition
of "person."
218. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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ney's fee, for injury to person or property caused by an agent
acting with apparent authority or by an employee acting within
the scope of his employment. It is no defense to liability under
this provision that the culpable person did not authorize, direct,
command, request, ratify, participate in, or have knowledge of
the racketeering activities engaged in by the agent or employee.
IV. Conclusion
There are circumstances in which a legitimate business entity
can and should be held liable under civil RICO. Because this liabil-
ity is necessarily derivative,219 it is important to fashion a workable
theory of vicarious liability that can be used in conjunction with civil
RICO. Private plaintiffs, struggling to reach the corporate pocket
through civil RICO, have tried various approaches. 2 This scramble
has resulted in chaos and confusion in the lower courts, a problem
which the Supreme Court seems unwilling to resolve. 21 Therefore, it
is up to Congress to fashion and implement such a theory.
In doing so, Congress should be mindful that neither the person-
enterprise structure of the statute222 nor the silence of RICO's fram-
ers223 lead to the conclusion that the ordinary rules of vicarious lia-
bility do not apply under RICO. On the contrary, the use of these
rules would further RICO's remedial purposes as well as the statu-
tory directive that it be liberally construed.22
Thus, an amendment to section 1964(c) of the statute, which
would provide for vicarious liability of a principal for the full mea-
sure of treble damages based upon the traditional principles of re-
spondeat superior and agency law, is appropriate. A vicarious liabil-
ity provision of this type will provide principals with an incentive to
abide by RICO and to develop effective procedures to supervise their
agents and employees. At the same time the provision will offer ade-
quate remedies so that private plaintiffs may vindicate wrongs com-
mitted against them by business entities as well as obtain redress for
these wrongs.
219. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 56-60, 107 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 47-48, 160 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
